انقلابِ علمِ انسانی

برام جالب بود.
البته بنظر میرسه هر چقدر دقت یک رابطه علمی بیشتر میشه مجموعه تحت تعریفش کوچکتر میشه . فکر میکنم همگرایی علم بسمت واگرایی شاخه های مورد مطالعه میره.
یه سواله اساسی دیگه اینه که آیا طبیعت رفتارش رو ممکنه در طول زمان تغییر بده. منظورم اینه ممکنه 5000 سال پیش معادلات انیشتین تقریب بدتری داشتند؟

در معادلات فيزيک هميشه سعي شده شرايط زماني و مکاني و... خاص در نظر گرفته شده باشه. به اين ترتيب که قوآنين رو به صورت تابعي از زمان مکان دما و.... نشون ميدن. من فکر ميکنم براي مطآلعه جآمعه به خاطر پيچيدگي وحشتناکش بهترين راه استفآده از نظريه سيستم هاي پيچيده هست. دليله عدم قطعيت در علوم اجتماعي به خاطر دقت پايين اندازه گيريهاي ما و پيچيدگي زياد سيستم مورد مطالعه هستش.

۲۹ارديبهشت ۱۳۸۵؛ کاملاْ مرتبط: سال نو مبارک! حالا ما بگيريم اواخر اسفند هشتاد و چهار :)

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:))

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
بحث جالب و پيچيده اي رو مطرح کردي. اما چند نکته خيلي مهم هست:
۱- به نظر من اساسا يکي از تفاوتهاي پارادايم در علوم طبيعي و علوم انساني در اين است که در علوم طبيعي ممکنه پارادايمها قدرت تبيين کنندگي خود را بر اثر بحران از دست بدهند و جايگزينشان پارادايمي ديگر بشه اما در علوم انساني پارادايمها هميشه به موازات هم در حرکتند و کناره گيري پارادايمها به شکلي که در علوم طبيعي اتفاق ميفته صورت نميگيره. البته اين مطلب علتهاي گوناگوني داره که ايتجا مجال بحث نيست اما فکر ميکنم علتهاي عمده رو بتونيم در ماهيت پارادايم در اين دو علم و مباحث جامعه شناسي علم دنبال کنيم.

۲- يک تفاوت مهمه ديگه نقش هدايتگري پارادايمها در علوم انساني هست که شايد يکي از علل نکته قبل باشه. من فکر ميکنم در علوم طبيعي چون هدايتگري انسان به معنايي که در علوم انساني هست وجود نداره پارادايمها در علوم انساني هميشه ارزش خودشون رو حفظ ميکنن و به اين آساني به بوته فراموشي سپرده نميشن.

۳- چون از طرفي پارادايمها در علوم انساني نسبت به علوم طبيعي آميختگي بيشتري با ارزشهاي انساني دارند و از طرف ديگر اين ارزشها در طول حيات بشري هميشه حضور دارند به همين دليل پارادايمهاي رقيب هميشه جايگاه خود را حفظ ميکنند.

۴- تفاوت عمده ديگه اين هست که فاصله ميان پارادايم به عنوان انديشه و کنش انساني به مثابه عمل در علوم انساني به مراتب کمتر از علوم طبيعي هست. به عبارت ديگه پارادايمها در علوم انساني زودتر به حوزه پراگماتيک انساني وارد ميشوند.

البته نکات ديگه اي رو هم ميشه اضافه کرد اما در مجال يک کامنت نيست.
در مجموع بايد بگم که کمتر سرگذشت پارادايمها در علوم انساني با علوم طبيعي قابل مقايسه هست و من فکر ميکنم تسري دادن تحولات پارادايمي در علوم طبيعي به علوم انساني کار چندان پسنديده اي نيست.

Source: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Kuhn and Social Science

Kuhn's influence outside of professional philosophy of science may have been even greater than it was within it. The social sciences in particular took up Kuhn with enthusiasm. There are primarily two reasons for this. First, Kuhn's picture of science appeared to permit a more liberal conception of what science is than hitherto, one that could be taken to include disciplines such as sociology and psychoanalysis. Secondly, Kuhn's rejection of rules as determining scientific outcomes appeared to permit appeal to other factors, external to science, in explaining why a scientific revolution took the course that it did.

The status as genuine sciences of what we now call the social and human sciences has widely been held in doubt. Such disciplines lack the remarkable track record of established natural sciences and seem to differ also in the methods they employed. More specifically they fail by pre-Kuhnian philosophical criteria of sciencehood. On the one hand, positivists required of a science that it should be verifiable by reference to its predictive successes. On the other, Popper's criterion was that a science should be potentially falsifiable by a prediction of the theory. Yet psychoanalysis, sociology and even economics have difficulty in making precise predictions at all, let alone ones that provide for clear confirmation or unambiguous refutation. Kuhn's picture of a mature science as being dominated by a paradigm that generated sui generis puzzles and criteria for assessing solutions to them could much more easily accommodate these disciplines. For example, Popper famously complained that psychoanalysis could not be scientific because it resists falsification. Kuhn's account argues that resisting falsification is precisely what every disciplinary matrix in science does. Even disciplines that could not claim to be dominated by a settled paradigm but were beset by competing schools with different fundamental ideas could appeal to Kuhn's description of the pre-paradigm state of a science in it infancy. Consequently Kuhn's analysis was popular among those seeking legitimacy as science (and consequently kudos and funding) for their new disciplines. Kuhn himself did not especially promote such extensions of his views, and indeed cast doubt upon them. He denied that psychoanalysis is a science and argued that there are reasons why some fields within the social sciences could not sustain extended periods of puzzle-solving normal science (1991b). Although, he says, the natural sciences involve interpretation just as human and social sciences do, one difference is that hermeneutic re-interpretation, the search for new and deeper intepretations, is the essence of many social scientific enterprises. This contrasts with the natural sciences where an established and unchanging interpretation (e.g. of the heavens) is a pre-condition of normal science. Re-intepretation is the result of a scientific revolution and is typically resisted rather than actively sought. Another reason why regular reinterpretation is part of the human sciences and not the natural sciences is that social and political systems are themselves changing in ways that call for new interpretations, whereas the subject matter of the natural sciences is constant in the relevant respects, permitting a puzzle-solving tradition as well as a standing source of revolution-generating anomalies.

A rather different influence on social science was Kuhn's influence on the development of social studies of science itself, in particular the ‘Sociology of Scientific Knowledge’. A central claim of Kuhn's work is that scientists do not make their judgments as the result of consciously or unconsciously following rules. Their judgments are nonetheless tightly constrained during normal science by the example of the guiding paradigm. During a revolution they are released from these constraints (though not completely). Consequently there is a gap left for other factors to explain scientific judgments. Kuhn himself suggests in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that Sun worship may have made Kepler a Copernican and that in other cases, facts about an individual's life history, personality or even nationality and reputation may play a role (1962/70a, 152-3). Later Kuhn repeated the point, with the additional examples of German Romanticism, which disposed certain scientists to recognize and accept energy conservation, and British social thought which enabled acceptance of Darwinism (1977c, 325). Such suggestions were taken up as providing an opportunity for a new kind of study of science, showing how social and political factors external to science influence the outcome of scientific debates. In what has become known as social constructivism/constructionism (e.g. Pickering 1984) this influence is taken to be central, not marginal, and to extend to the very content of accepted theories. Kuhn's claim and its exploitation can be seen as analogous to or even an instance of the exploitation of the (alleged) underdetermination of theory by evidence (c.f. Kuhn 1992, 7). Feminists and social theorists (e.g. Nelson 1993) have argued that the fact that the evidence, or, in Kuhn's case, the shared values of science, do not fix a single choice of theory, allows external factors to determine the final outcome (see Martin 1991 and Schiebinger 1999 for feminist social constructivism). Furthermore, the fact that Kuhn identified values as what guide judgment opens up the possibility that scientists ought to employ different values, as has been argued by feminist and post-colonial writers (e.g. Longino 1994).

Kuhn himself, however, showed only limited sympathy for such developments. In his “The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science” (1992) Kuhn derides those who (including the proponents of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge) take the view that in the ‘negotiations’ that determine the accepted outcome of an experiment or its theoretical significance, all that counts are the interests and power relations among the participants. Even if this is not entirely fair to the Strong Programme, it reflects Kuhn's own view that the primary determinants of the outcome of a scientific episode are to be found within science. First, the five values Kuhn ascribes to all science are in his view constitutive of science. An enterprise could have different values but it would not be science (1977c, 331; 1993, 338). Secondly, when a scientist is influenced by individual or other factors in applying these values or in coming to a judgment when these values are not decisive, those influencing factors will typically themselves come from within science (especially in modern, professionalized science). Personality may play a role in the acceptance of a theory, because, for example, one scientist is more risk-averse than another (1977c, 325)—but that is still a relationship to the scientific evidence. Even when reputation plays a part, it is typically scientific reputation that encourages the community to back the opinion of an eminent scientist. Thirdly, in a large community such variable factors will tend to cancel out. Kuhn supposes that individual differences are normally distributed and that a judgment corresponding to the mean of the distribution will also correspond to the judgment that would, hypothetically, be demanded by the rules of scientific method, as traditionally conceived (1977c, 333). Moreover, the existence of differences of response within the leeway provided by shared values is crucial to science, since it permits “rational men to disagree” (1977c, 332) and thus to commit themselves to rival theories. Thus the looseness of values and the differences they permit “may . . . appear an indispensable means of spreading the risk which the introduction or support of novelty always entails“ (Ibid.).

اول این که مفهوم پارادایم اگر بیشتر در علوم انسانی به کار می رود، پس مبدعش چرا اول آن را برای علوم دقیقه تعریف کرد؟
دوم این که بابت معرفی مقاله ی آرش نراقی خیلی ممنون، با یه جستجوی ساده پیداش کردم. adobe هم نصب کردم! سالومون، نویسنده ی اصلی مقاله را هم بد نیست برای من کمی معرفی اش کنید. به امید دیدار!